Battle of Somosierra: Difference between revisions

The Battle of Somosierra was a battle of the Peninsular War that took place on November 30, 1808 at the Somosierra pass in the Sierra de Guadarrama north of Madrid. It was a victory for the French under Napoleon and led directly to the fall of Madrid on December 4. The most famous episode of the battle was a spectacular Polish cavalry charge led by Jan Kozietulski.

Situation before the battle

By late November 1808, the French juggernaut had overwhelmed and destroyed both wings of the Spanish popular army. To complete his reconquest of Spain, Napoleon advanced on Madrid with 45,000 men of his Grande Armée.

General San Juan mustered an ad hoc army of militia, reservists, and various regular regiments reeling from earlier defeats; in all about 20,000 men, to defend Madrid. In order to screen the many approaches to the city, San Juan was obliged to deconcentrate his already greatly outnumbered forces. Under his orders, 9,000 men were dispatched west to guard the Guadarrama pass while 3,500 occupied an advanced post at Sepulvida, leaving only 9,000 men and 16 guns on the heights of Somosierra.

Somosierra pass

The nature of the terrain and the tenacity of the Spaniards initially worked in their favour. On the evening of November 29 the brigade at Sepulvida repulsed a French attack, inflicted heavy casualties, and escaped from overwhelming French numbers in the gathering darkness.

The next morning, Napoleon advanced his infantry directly toward the pass while small detachments crept up the flanks. Exchanging musket volleys with the defenders, the French made slow but measurable progress toward the enemy guns.

The Polish charge

Because the Spanish forces could not easily be outflanked by infantry movement, and Napoleon was impatient to proceed, he ordered his Polish Light Horse escort to charge the Spaniards and their fortified artillery batteries. His reasons to do it and the effects of the charge are quite controversial.

The placement of Spanish cannons

Don Benito San Juan had 16 cannons in his disposition. In some western accounts, based mostly on relations of French officers, it is assumed that all these cannons were placed in the very top of the Somosierra way. However, it was not the case. All the cannons placed on the top would not cover the whole terrain, only some 600-700 metres, and would allow the French to march undisturbed through 3/4 of the way. However, relations do report that Napoleon, when looking on the battlefield, was under artillery fire. Also reports of chevau-légers that took part in the charge (among them Kozietulski and Chłopicki) as well as from Spanish prisoners captured before the battle mention that Benito de San Juan had cannons in four batteries, not one.

The first one was defending the entrance to the Somosierra way, then two others placed on the way and fourth, the last, placed on the top. It was usually assumed that all batteries had four cannons, but the pass was too narrow for that to be possible. French artillery, when ordered to fire, could not use more than two cannons at the time. Also Chłopicki and Kozietulski clearly stated that in the first battery they took two cannons. Most probably the first three batteries were two cannons each, for more there was simply no place. The fourth was the largest and had ten cannons. French officers, who after the charge saw it, clearly memorised only those last, the largest battery, maybe they even did not see or notice the others. This mistake is still repeated in many western works, even written by respected historians.

Napoleon's orders

There were no writtern orders of Napoleon. Kozietulski, who was commanding the 3rd squadron at the day, mentioned he only received order "letka jazda kłusem" (spelling as in original, in English: "light cavalry in trot") and only passing by the emperor's position they have heard "Polonais, prenez-moi ces canons" - "Poles, take those cannons for me". Many western authors assumed that Napoleon simply went out of his mind, ordering Poles to charge against one large battery of 16 cannons, over few kilometres of extremely difficult terrain. However, as seen above, there was not one, but four batteries, and only the bottom one was firing and stopping infantry progress.

It seems that Napoleon ordered taking only the closest battery, to open way for his infantry. Also Kozietulski seemed to understand this order that way, because when he lost his horse after taking it, he reported to the emperor that he fulfilled his orders (according to his relation written directly few days after the battle, the relation being the most reliable as not affected by later controversies). Taking first battery was difficult, but within cavalry capabilities. However, after taking it, the chevau-légers found themselves under fire from the other battery, so they had two choices: either to withdraw, or to attack further. Rotmistrz Jan Dziewanowski, who took the command after Kozietulski lost his horse, decided to press the attack. After taking second and third battery the situation was repeated and finally squadron took all batteries. However, only few chevau-légers reached the last battery and Spanish were able to recapture it. It was then when Napoleon saw the chance and immedietely used it, sending another squadrons. Those squadrons had it much easier task, since first three batteries were already taken, but still they had to capture the last one.

Who commanded the charge

13th bulletin mentioned that chevau-légers were commanded by Gen. Louis Pierre, Count Montbrun. However, both Polish charge participants mentioned above and Lt.Col. Pierre Dautancourt, one of the commanders of the unit, stressed in their relations that this was not the case. Datancourt mentioned in his relation that Montbrun in conversations with him himself was laughing from that idea. Yet French historian Adolphe Thiers gave him the honours of leading the charge, which caused the protest by Polish living participants of the battle. Also Maj. Philippe de Ségur in his memories wrote that he was commanding the charge, but his relations were often described as unreliable and again both Datancourt and Poles denied his role.

First charge was led by Kozietulski, but he lost his horse after taking the first battery. Only then squadron was joined by Lt. Andrzej Niegolewski, who was on reconeissance with his soldiers. The charge was continued under command of Dziewanowski, and when he fell from the horse after taking the third battery, by Wincenty Krasiński. The charge to last battery was led by Niegolewski, who then survived almost by miracle when Spanish attacked the cannons and recaptured then (he received nine wounds from bayonnettes and wound on the head; he himself stated he was shot at in the head (!), but in documents it is mentioned it is wound from a sabre).

The second charge was led by Tomasz Łubieński, who then also tried to give himself the whole glory, trying to minimise the role of the third squadron (while Niegolewski tried to show that he took the canons and Łubieński had it so easy so Spanish were shooting at him with candies).

Charge effects

French officers tried to minimise the effect of the Polish charge, saying that all the success should be given to French infantry of Gen Francois Ruffin. Yet still 13th bulletin of Great army mentioned lead role of Polish chevau-légers. It must be also stressed, that even first charge was able to took all four batteries, even if the success was temporary and the last was quickly recaptured, which allowed French infantry to press their attack, and that the second charge took the last battery again which caused en-masse retreat of Spanish Andalusian irregular militia and in the effect retreat of the whole army. It must be noted that Spanish artillery men were unusually brave and that they preferred to die than abandon their position - but no Polish relation mentioned any fight with Spanish militia. Militiamen just left their position seeing how seemingly easily Poles took the artillery positions. In the fog and smoke they could not see how few Poles were on the top.

To summarise, the Somosierra charge was a spectacular success achieved with minimal cost from the viewpoint of Napoleon - even though Polish losses were relatively high (see below).

Number of soldiers charging

Usually it is said that the number of Poles taking part in the charge was 125 or 140. However, the registers of the unit clearly show that the state of the squadron was about 216. To that number must be added members of other squadrons, in total about 450. The number of 80 found sometimes is about only the first charge against first battery - before the squadron was joined by Niegolewski with his soldiers returning from reconnaissance. It is not clear however, whether the number include only the front-line troops (sabres) or all the soldiers of the units.

Polish losses

The unit registers show the deaths (not counting the officers) as 12 Poles from 3rd squadron (plus 2 others who died from wounds), and 2 from 1st squadron and 4 from 2nd squadron (plus one who died later from wounds). With officers, total losses were 18 dead and 11 wounded, from which 5 later died from wounds. Those were large losses, but all Polish squadrons were operational within few days after the battle. Datancourt mentioned in his relation 57 dead and wounded. The Poles were probably much helped by the fog, which made it harder for Spanish to target them. While large losses, it was still relatively low cost for such a spectacular victory.

Aftermath

San Juan raced his army back to Madrid. Although the victory at Somosierra was more accurately the result of a combined infantry and cavalry attack, with the infantry bearing the heavier fighting, later accounts, Napoleon's included, placed all the emphasis on the gallant Polish charge.

French patrols reached the outskirts of Madrid on December 1. General San Juan made a half-hearted and futile attempt to defend the capital, and on December 24, a devastating French artillery barrage brought the Spanish defence to grief. San Juan surrendered his remaining 2,500 regulars; the 20,000 civilians under his banner dispersed; and the French entered Madrid for the second time that year.