What it means — and could mean — to be India’s National Security Advisor

Second, it appears the ANSA would now be the gatekeeper in the communication chain between six mid-level unit heads (three Dy NSAs and three service officers) and the NSA. This also means an additional bureaucratic layer has been created between the PM and those monitoring national security on a daily basis. Will the PM’s daily security briefings be done by the NSA or the ANSA or both? What of the relationship between the intelligence czars and the PM, and the CDS and PM?

The changes made to the security architecture have raised many questions down the line, both within the civil and military bureaucracies. They have also prompted speculation about the future of the incumbent NSA, Ajit Doval. Is his elevation a precursor to honourable retirement? Will the ANSA, Rajinder Khanna, succeed him? Will someone from the outside replace both in due course? Lack of clarity on such questions would impact the efficiency of the new arrangement.

One can see that a quarter century after the creation of the office of NSA, the institution, its place within the national government and its responsibilities and remit, are still evolving. While there is a lot of published material on the history of the evolution of the office of NSA, the question raised by K Subrahmanyam — the strategic affairs guru intimately associated with the creation of the office, along with KC Pant and Jaswant Singh — in a 2010 article, “Does India Need an NSA?”, has not yet been satisfactorily answered. Subrahmanyam himself answered that question in the affirmative but I believe he would have preferred an institutional separation between “thinkers” and “actors”, as well as direct access to the PM for intelligence chiefs and the military leadership.

Both in 2005, after the demise of the then NSA JN Dixit, and in 2014, before the appointment of Ajit Doval, there was much discussion on who ought to fill that post. The turf war was between officers of the foreign service and police service. In the event, on both occasions, an IPS officer and former head of internal intelligence was finally chosen. The absence of any clearly laid out criteria and qualifications for the post and, worse, clearly specified duties and chain of command, has left the question open as to who should be made NSA — a diplomat, a spook, a soldier or a scholar?

When Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee first created the post he chose to name the Principal Secretary to the PM as the NSA. From 1998 to 2004 the late Brajesh Mishra defined the work of an NSA by living that role. His successor, JN Dixit, had to redefine the role because Prime Minister Singh separated the two posts, appointing an IAS officer, TKA Nair, as Principal Secretary and Dixit as NSA. Dr Singh further complicated the matter by appointing Narayanan as an internal security advisor. By the time the internal turf wars between the IAS, IFS and IPS ended, Dixit passed away and Narayanan took over. He was succeeded by Shivshankar Menon of the foreign service.

While both Doval and Narayanan have similar professional backgrounds, PM Modi has not only elevated the rank of NSA to that of cabinet minister, but has also widened the remit by integrating national security management with higher defence management. This, too, is an experiment whose advisability and experience have not been adequately and professionally evaluated so far.

Finally, given the recent and ongoing controversy about the activities of R&AW, brought into global focus by charges levelled by state agencies in Canada and the United States, as well as the controversy around the decision-making process with respect to the Agniveer initiative, the role and remit of the NSA have once again come into focus.

Should the NSA have a diplomatic, bureaucratic, military, police or intelligence background? Is national security management about intelligence gathering or processing? Should those processing intelligence belong to organisations gathering intelligence? Indeed, should the priority for national security management be experience in internal security or external security for a country like India? So on and so forth. The role and responsibility of the NSA and of the National Security Council have evolved with time and changing circumstance. The material in the public domain remains limited for any informed comment on these questions.

A restructuring offers an opportunity for a fresh look at these questions. The Kargil Review Committee chaired by K Subrahmanyam had suggested that the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) should directly report to the PM. By giving the NSA a cabinet rank and the CDS the rank of a secretary to the Union government, the political leadership has done a disservice to the armed forces. The CDS is not even a permanent member of the cabinet committee on security. Given the challenges being faced with respect to defence modernisation and organisation, and given the security environment in our neighbourhood, the CDS must report directly to the PM and only maintain a consultative relationship with the NSA.

The fact is that successive NSAs have been learning on the job in dealing with national security challenges ranging from the border problem with China to handling political challenges in border states, and these challenges have only grown with time.

The author was Member, National Security Advisory Board of India, 1999-2001 and media advisor to Prime Minister of India, 2004-08