Kindle app logo image

Download the free Kindle app and start reading Kindle books instantly on your smartphone, tablet, or computer - no Kindle device required.

Read instantly on your browser with Kindle for Web.

Using your mobile phone camera - scan the code below and download the Kindle app.

QR code to download the Kindle App

Follow the author

Something went wrong. Please try your request again later.

Tank Tactics: From Normandy to Lorraine (Art of War) First Edition


{"desktop_buybox_group_1":[{"displayPrice":"$75.00","priceAmount":75.00,"currencySymbol":"$","integerValue":"75","decimalSeparator":".","fractionalValue":"00","symbolPosition":"left","hasSpace":false,"showFractionalPartIfEmpty":true,"offerListingId":"d4uAO8OoZv6ePtvOrCAHNrPeXU11hQe3DcagPE36u30bl96CewdlyL74FOcEU3U8rAJdRAXxyRUHDgJcMDR83VgndSNjhzO6ja6qXSYLuk8lr6GcaKpnGcr%2FCh%2FyUaPcbigCwaSFAJQ%3D","locale":"en-US","buyingOptionType":"NEW","aapiBuyingOptionIndex":0}]}

Purchase options and add-ons

"An operational critique of the art of war as practiced by U.S. and Canadian tank commanders in France in 1944, Tank Tactics also traces the evolution of North American armored doctrine." "Jarymowycz draws on after-action reports, extensive battlefield reconnaissance (involving both Allied and German veterans), and recently discovered battle performance reviews, as well as Allied and German interrogation reports, war diaries, and technical evaluations, to compare and evaluate combat success and failure. He provides detailed tactical diagrams and analyses of tank versus tank engagements - and illustrates the frustrations of commanders attempting maneuver warfare under the exasperating caution of Bradley and the questionable direction of Montgomery." "This penetrating analysis features a review of tank battles in Lorraine, where the U.S. Third Army commanders demonstrated mastery of mission command doctrine. Jarymowycz concludes by comparing U.S. and Soviet approaches to operational maneuver, describing creative tactical mixes found in combat commands well before battle groups became common in NATO parlance."--BOOK JACKET.

Amazon First Reads | Editors' picks at exclusive prices

Customer reviews

4.3 out of 5 stars
4.3 out of 5
46 global ratings

Top reviews from the United States

Reviewed in the United States on April 4, 2024
The author leads up to the role of Allied armor in Normandy and Loraine with how doctrine evolved from WW I through WW II. Although the book is mostly focused on US, British, and Canadian armor doctrine, he also covers the evolution of German and Soviet doctrine. Indeed, his account of Soviet doctrine is perhaps the best one I've ever read. The author pulls no punches wrt senior Allied leaders. Montgomery, Bradley, and Eisenhower made numerous mistakes. Whereas the Germans excelled in Normandy at the tactical level of war, the Soviets by 1944 outperformed the Germans and the Western Allies at the operational level of war, especially wrt the employment of massive armor/artillery concentrations. Little know facts, such as the Soviet STAVKA representatives who visited Normany while the campaign was in progress, are gems for any reader.
Reviewed in the United States on February 22, 2009
This is not, as one might think from the title, just a book about either tank tactics (how small tank units behave in combat), or just about Normandy and Lorraine operations by the Allied forces in 1944.

COL. Jarymowycz offers an extraordinarily deep and well researched work that traces the development, or rather lack there of, of armoured doctrine and its tools of the trade, the tanks, in the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States, and compares this development with those in Germany and the USSR in the pre-war period, and the early years of the war. He then shows that inter-branch rivalry and disinterest in the Anglo-block countries by their higher Staff officers, a lack of insight into lessons learned in 1940 France or during the North African campaign, and the ignoring of the Eastern Front intelligence led to tank forces which landed in Normandy untrained for the sort of tank warfare that had been conducted on the Eastern Front for some three years, lacking in operational and strategic doctrine for employing tank forces, and lacking the tanks with which to combat new German panzers.

Jarymowycz destroys some well-known myths about the Allied successes, German military prowess and a belief in Soviet ineptitude that persisted in NATO until the late 1970s when John Erickson and Richard Simpkin begun to shed light on the subject.

The book offers a very good focused comparative study companion to the many books on the use of operational and strategic armoured forces on the Eastern Front by Richard Simpkin and David Glantz.

For those interested in how and why the Second World War was won in Europe, this is an invaluable and must-read book.
24 people found this helpful
Report
Reviewed in the United States on June 2, 2016
Very good book.
Reviewed in the United States on December 16, 2019
Roman Jarymowycz, an armor officer, in the Canadian armed forces, has a unique perspective. One that the consumer would be hard pressed to find among the myriad of authors who write the kind of popular histories one can find on the shelves of retail outlets. For example, the authors assessment of the troops of the 4th armored division, during the Lorraine campaign. His assertion that the tankers and armored infantry of the division thoroughly outmaneuvered, at all echelons, their German counterparts. Many of whom, such as Balck and von Mannteufel, are among the most respected German officers of the war. They did this without the use of AirPower, against a force (the Germans) that was qualitatively and quantitatively superior. If you would like to know more, purchase this book.
One person found this helpful
Report
Reviewed in the United States on June 5, 2016
Definitely worth reading.The book describes American / British / Canadian tank tactics and attacks primarily in the Normandy campaign and also somewhat in the movements across northern France and north toward Belgium and east toward Germany. The main focus of the book is on Operations and overall movement strategy -- what the German army leadership referred to as "Bewegungskrieg." The most interesting part, I felt, were the comparisons of Allied concepts of maneuver warfare with what was happening on the Eastern front between Germany and the Soviets. Chapter 14 "Stavka in Normandy" was especially interesting. Now for the negatives: you need to possess a really good background on the overall campaign in Normandy, and a REALLY good background on the many campaigns and battles in the Eastern Front and the evolution of German and Soviet armored warfare concepts in order to follow and understand this book. There is also, I felt, a weak understanding and discussion of how the western Allies defeated the German army in Normandy and northern France. While reading this book, you sometimes have to wonder how the poor dumb Americans and Brits ever managed to chase the German army out of France. There is a lack of an overall discussion of the big picture: yes, American and British concepts of tank warfare left much to be desired, but they were good enough to win when you consider everything else involved in the war in the West: total air supremacy (and how that developed), a huge superiority in industrial effort and output, and an overall superiority in STRATEGY. The allies won the war because they did a much better job of coordinating industrial production, logistics, intelligence, and combat. Combat may have been the Allies greatest weakness, but they won the other three items hands down. The Allies also never got confused about the idea that wars could be be won by "will"or "fighting spirit" as the Japanese and the Nazi leaderships thought.

I suggest reading the following books before attempting this one: Why Normandy Was Won: Operation Bagration and the War in the East by Weiler (2010); "Death of the Wehrmacht" by Citino (2007); "The Wehrmacht Retreats" also by Citino (2012); "Hitler's Nemesis" by Dunn (1994); "Soviet Blitzkrieg" also by Dunn (2000). Then there are the several excellent books by David Glantz on the Soviet military development and the battles and campaigns in the East, but that may not really be necessary (and very heavy reading) in order to read this book.
6 people found this helpful
Report
Reviewed in the United States on August 30, 2021
The author both brings new information and reinforces some myths, he correctly explains the evolution of how the Western nations and Soviets changed their armored doctrine throughout the war, my only issue is for auchba researched work, the Sherman being so weak to Tigers chapter is full of biases and myths

Top reviews from other countries

Matthias Dorn
5.0 out of 5 stars Eine sehr gute Informationsquelle für Geschichtsinteressierte und Historiker.
Reviewed in Germany on January 3, 2022
Gefällt mir sehr gut, der Aufbau und die beschriebenen Taktiken auf beiden Seiten. Das man sich ein Bild machen kann. Das Buch empfehle ich sehr, für die, die sich für die Geschichte der Panzertaktik 1944 interessieren.
RAUL
3.0 out of 5 stars Un poco desilusionado.
Reviewed in Spain on June 26, 2017
De forma general cuenta las campañas y los inicios de los cuerpos acorazados, Biene con muuuuuuuuuchos esquemas y tablas.
si quieres algo mas especifico, compra otro libro que sea especifico de esa batalla o campaña en particular.
William Rolston
5.0 out of 5 stars Should be mandatory reading.
Reviewed in Canada on September 5, 2016
Excellent research and doesn't pull punches. By far one of the best books about the Normandy campaign. There are a couple of statements that put my teeth on edge as they are particularly uncharitable interpretation or slight miss-interpretation of facts but they are tangential to the broad thrust of the book. (one example, he says that American antipathy towards DD tanks lead to them not being on Omaha. It's well known that Americans didn't like "novelty tanks" like the DD's but that wasn't the reason they weren't on the beach at Omaha. Also, as mentioned elsewhere, there are conflicting mentions about the effectiveness of bombing and consistently of tank doctrine but I put that up to the uncertainty of war)
まげ店長
5.0 out of 5 stars 連合軍の戦車戦術
Reviewed in Japan on February 17, 2014
ドイツ戦車の戦い方は「パンツァー・タクティクス」という名著がありますが、
パンツァータクティク―WW2ドイツ軍戦車部隊戦術マニュアル
Panzer Tactics: German Small-Unit Armor Tactics in World War II (原書)
(上記2冊は小隊・中隊レベルの戦術に特化しているのに対し、
 本書はもう少し大きな大隊・師団レベルを多く説明しています。
 もちろん、シャーマン vs ティーガーなど、小隊レベルもありますが...
 違うと言われれば違いますし、逆に言うと両方読んでもかち合いません)

私の感覚では実力のある戦車は勝って当たり前。
如何に弱い戦車が勝てるのか?というと、やはり連合軍の戦車ですね。
まずは第一次世界大戦の戦車&騎馬活用法から始まり、砂漠戦も入れながら
やはりメインはサブタイトル通りにノルマンディー上陸作戦以降の戦い方です。
巻末にはドイツ軍やソ連軍の戦車戦術まで載っていて、美味しい限りです。
One person found this helpful
Report
phaze
2.0 out of 5 stars Biased, tired and light on actual operational detail.
Reviewed in the United Kingdom on September 25, 2016
For full disclosure, I guess I should state that a lot of my views on WWII run directly contrary to Jarymowicz's. I knew this going in and to put it simply, nothing he wrote he managed to convince me and a lot ot it I just see a nonsense stemming from author's virtual deification of tired old things like /Fingerspitzengefühl/Patton.

For a book that wants to undertake an analysis of Western operational art and maneuver it's puzzling that things like Dragoon/Market Garden/Queen/Patton's Lorraine offensives/Veritable-Grenade/ Post-Rhine exploitation are omitted. The analysis of operations we get is short, sometimes as little as a dozen of pages and not very detailed. Through it all, runs the ever intense hatred of Montgomery who can't do no right in Jarymowicz's eyes. Bolstered by a saucy choice of quotes from Fuller, Patton, Harmon, Hansen, Conningham, all very objective people, every negative interpretation of his decisions is taken up and any mitigating circumstance or good decision is left ignored. Leading Jarymowicz to even blame him for not using US armored corps in the wake of Goodwood, not understanding neither the terms under which the coalition operated, nor the necessity of such troops for Cobra. It's all the more perplexing since the aAuthor (rightly if I might say so) extols the Soviet approach, yet doesn't see that of the western generals, Montgomery's approach, with his narrow breakthrough sectors, heavy concentration of troops, artillery, armor and echeloning of them in depth, was the closest to the Soviet one. British/Canadian Great Swan is also completely ignored while Patton's drive through non existent resistance, his stumbling in front of Metz and a set of tactical engagements around Arracourt, which he had no influence on and that spelled the end of 3rd Army's exploitation is the "maturation of maneuver warfare". It's an easy to read book but one that offers precious little over it's 1980's antecedents and doesn't even attempt to address the more modern historiography push that rehabilitates British/Canadian effort
6 people found this helpful
Report