Joint Committee on Tourism, Culture, Arts, Sport and Media díospóireacht -
Wednesday, 26 Jun 2024

We have received apologies from Senator Warfield. If our guests can bear with me, we have a little housekeeping to go through first. We have some committee business to dispose of before we hear opening statements. Can I take it that the minutes of our meetings on 15 and 22 May 2024 are formally agreed and that there are no matters arising? Is that agreed? Agreed.

This meeting has been convened with officials from the Department of Tourism, Culture, Arts, Gaeltacht, Sport and Media and representatives from Coimisiún na Meán, the working group of the national counter-disinformation strategy and An Garda Síochána to discuss the State's response to online disinformation and digital media literacy, including social media and fake news, and to continue the committee's engagement on related matters. From the online safety and digital regulation unit of the Department of Tourism, Culture, Arts, Gaeltacht, Sport and Media, I warmly welcome Mr. Seamus Hempenstall, principal officer, and Mr. Paul Kilkenny, assistant principal officer. From Coimisiún na Meán, I welcome Mr. Jeremy Godfrey, executive chairperson, whom we have had before us a number of times. He is very welcome back again. He is joined by Ms Stephanie Comey, director of media literacy and user education, and Mr. Tiernan Kenny, director of communications and public affairs. From the national counter-disinformation strategy working group, I welcome Ms Martina Chapman, independent chairperson and independent consultant on media literacy and national co-ordinator for Media Literacy Ireland. Joining Ms Chapman from the working group is Dr. Eileen Culloty, assistant professor at DCU's school of communications, deputy director of the DCU institute for future media democracy and society and co-chair of Media Literary Ireland. From An Garda Síochána, I welcome Ms Cliona Richardson, assistant commissioner for the north-western region, and Chief Superintendent Barry Walsh, Garda National Cyber Crime Bureau. There are lots of titles and many people. It is great to have all the experts in this area present. I thank them for joining us.

The format of today's meeting is such that I will invite our witnesses to deliver opening statements limited to three minutes. This will be followed by questions from members of the committee. The committee may publish the opening statements on its web page. Is that agreed? Agreed.

Before we proceed to the opening statements, I wish to explain some limitations in respect of parliamentary privilege and the practice of the Houses as regards references witnesses may make to other persons in their evidence. The evidence of witnesses physically present or who give evidence from within the parliamentary precincts is protected, pursuant to both the Constitution and statute, by absolute privilege in respect of the presentations they make to the committee. This means that they have an absolute defence against any defamation action for anything they say at this meeting. However, they are expected not to abuse this privilege. It is my duty as Chair to ensure that this privilege is not abused. Witnesses are also asked to note that only evidence connected with the subject matter of these proceedings should be given. They should respect directions given by the Chair and the parliamentary practice to the effect that, where possible, they should not criticise or make charges against any person or entity by name or in such a way as to make him, her or it identifiable or otherwise engage in speech that might be regarded as damaging to the person's or entity's good name. Therefore, if a witness's statement is potentially defamatory in respect of an identifiable person or entity, he or she will be asked to discontinue his or her remarks.

Members are reminded of the long-standing parliamentary practice to the effect that they should not comment on, criticise or make charges against a person outside the Houses or an official either by name or in such a way as to make him or her identifiable.

I propose that we proceed to the opening statements. I call on Mr. Hempenstall to speak first on behalf of the Department. Then we will go to Mr. Godfrey on behalf of Coimisiún na Meán, Ms Chapman on behalf of the national counter-disinformation strategy working group and Ms Richardson on behalf of An Garda Síochána.

I thank the Cathaoirleach and the embers of the committee for the invitation to discuss with them the State's response to online disinformation and media literacy. I am joined by my departmental colleague Mr. Paul Kilkenny. Mr. Kilkenny and I, with our colleagues Kevin and Eve in the unit I head up, act as secretariat to the national counter-disinformation strategy working group, which is chaired by Ms Chapman and has Dr. Culloty as a member, both of whom are with us today. The group was established, as I am sure members are aware, in fulfilment of a recommendation of the Future of Media Commission. The commission recognised that while disinformation has been with us for centuries, the advent of new technologies such as social media means that it can spread further and faster than ever before. It can be harder to recognise and more damaging in its effects. The latter makes it more complex to deal with and means that no single approach can solve it. This is probably the most important reason for developing the strategy - to bring together the key stakeholders across Government, industry, academia and civil society to develop a more co-ordinated and strategic approach that aims to reduce the creation and spread of this false and harmful material and help combat its damaging effects.

The working group has been in operation since February 2023. We are in the final stages of its work. I acknowledge with thanks the significant work of every member of our multi-stakeholder working group for their valuable contributions.

In terms of developing the strategy, the group comprises stakeholders from Departments and a range of other representative bodies: Technology Ireland; the National Youth Council of Ireland; Coimisiún na Meán, our independent media regulator; An Coimisiún Toghcháin, the Electoral Commission; the Library Association; the Irish Council for Civil Liberties; Media Literacy Ireland; Webwise; the Institute for Future Media, Democracy and Society; and the Press Ombudsman. The group has heard from a range of national and international experts and practitioners in the field of disinformation. The group conducted a public consultation process and held a stakeholder consultation event. It has been a very worthwhile exercise, and we look forward to the publication of the strategy.

As regards the content, the strategy takes a rights-based approach based on five principles. The first of these is protecting freedom of expression, which is fundamental to combating disinformation. The others are building resilience through education and media literacy, supporting quality journalism and the provision of reliable public interest information, regulatory enforcement, and research on what does and does not work in combating this complex problem. What is Ireland doing? We are using a range of approaches. Education, including through media literacy initiatives, is key.

Coimisiún na Meán, as our new media and online safety regulator, is and will be critical in ensuring that regulations like the Digital Services Act are fairly and fully implemented. Supporting public service media though initiatives like the media fund is vital to protect information integrity. We also need to keep learning and researching both the sources and impacts of disinformation if we are to keep pace and keep combatting it effectively.

My colleagues here will be able to discuss particular aspects of the fight against disinformation. I will be happy to answer questions relating to the strategy process itself.

I thank the committee for inviting us to appear today. I am joined, as the Cathaoirleach stated, by my colleagues Ms Stephanie Comey and Mr. Tiernan Kenny.

Coimisiún na Meán's overall purpose is to ensure a thriving, diverse, creative, safe and trusted media landscape. This plays a crucial role in supporting our open democratic society.

Disinformation and misinformation can undermine democracy and may require, as Mr. Hempenstall said, a cross-societal approach. Coimisiún na Meán has contributed to the national counter-disinformation strategy working group. We expect to have a significant role in implementing the actions arising from the strategy. I would like to highlight three ways in which we help address the challenge of disinformation, namely our regulation of online platforms, our promotion of media literacy and our promotion of reliable and trustworthy journalism.

The recent elections to the European Parliament and the local and Limerick mayoral elections were the first elections held since the EU Digital Services Act became fully applicable earlier this year. We worked with the European Commission and our counterparts in other member states on the development of guidelines as to how platforms should analyse and respond to the threats posed by disinformation and misinformation. We co-ordinated the implementation of the guidelines in Ireland. This included facilitating collaboration between the platforms based here, An Coimisiún Toghcháin and accredited fact-checkers. While a full review of the elections and the effectiveness of the guidelines is pending, the European Digital Media Observatory has noted that there were no large-scale, last-minute disinformation incidents.

However, overall levels of online disinformation about the EU increased significantly in the months before the vote. There were also incidents of online abuse of electoral candidates. We provided candidates with a briefing pack on their rights. We will review how we can improve the effectiveness of the mechanisms for protecting participants in public life from online hate speech and harassment.

We have long promoted media literacy through our support of Media Literacy Ireland. This initiative aims to counter disinformation by equipping people to evaluate information. The initiative also aims to increase awareness about the ownership, operation and regulation of the media landscape. This helps citizens make informed choices about what they see, read and share online.

We collaborate on media literacy initiatives with our regulatory counterparts and media literacy experts across Europe in order that we can identify and apply best practices in media literacy. We also helped to localise and promote pan-European media literacy campaigns associated with the recent elections.

Trusted journalism plays an important role in promoting information integrity and countering disinformation. We support trust in broadcast journalism with our rules requiring fairness, accuracy and balance in news and current affairs. We also recognise the role of public service media in providing reliable journalism and deploying it online as well as in traditional broadcast bulletins.

We have begun a review of the broadcasting moratorium to consider if it is still effective and useful in the shifting media landscape. We expect to have that review concluded later this year.

We intend to open applications for our first two journalism schemes focusing on reporting on district courts and the activities of local authorities shortly. While the schemes are not designed to address fake news, a thriving and pluralistic news media landscape can help to meet the challenges of disinformation and fake news. The Future of Media Commission report recommended the creation of five journalism schemes. We look forwarding to bringing these to life in due course.

I thank the Chairperson and the committee for the invitation to speak today as independent chair of the National Counter Disinformation working group. I am joined by Dr. Eileen Culloty who is also member of the working group.

Disinformation is concerning because it deceives citizens, distorts evidence and undermines the democratic process. This is not new. Powerful actors have always weaponised disinformation and used it for financial gain, political influence and social notoriety. What is new is how the attention economies of online platforms are able to propel disinformation faster and further than ever before, aided by personal data and algorithmic systems which can exploit the fears and concerns of people to hijack and distort democratic, public debate.

What is also new is how information is created. Some information is produced by media or individuals who adhere to rules and regulations and some is produced by media or individuals who do not. The difference is not always well understood. That makes it harder to judge the reliability and accuracy of information. This situation is made worse by attacks on journalists and researchers who investigate disinformation. There are also other factors which can make individuals vulnerable to disinformation narratives. We have outlined a number of those in the working group's subgroup reports, which are all available online.

For all that, we must remember that disinformation can be subjective and a matter of debate. It is not always possible to establish clear-cut facts. In addition, some issues are fundamentally matters of ideology and opinion. In a free society, people are entitled to express and believe things that are incorrect. Across the EU, disinformation is understood to be legal but harmful content and states can mitigate that harm in different ways. Countering disinformation is clearly a cross-policy issue that requires a co-ordinated approach. This is evidenced by the range of representatives on the working group. I thank Seamus, Paul, Kevin and Eve from the Department for providing the secretariat support to the working group.

As Mr. Hempenstall mentioned, the working group is in the process of developing a national strategy. The purpose of which is not to decide what is and is not disinformation and neither is it to call for new legislation. The purpose of the strategy is to adopt a rights-based approach to counter disinformation. Another purpose is to encourage cross-sector co-operation, collaboration and co-ordination to achieve better results all round.

The strategy is likely to include a number of specific recommended actions around the themes of media literacy, research, promoting trust in media and effective implementation of existing legislation. The working group operates by consensus and agreement, so the recommended actions are been designed in conjunction with the bodies that will have responsibility for delivering them. I would like to thank the members of the working group members for their engagement in this process and hope that continues over time.

Disinformation is a dynamic and ever-evolving problem and our response to it must be dynamic and ever-evolving. So this strategy should be viewed as the first step in a much longer term process and that will require the monitoring and updating of the actions, on a regular basis, in response to global, national and local developments.

I thank the Chairman and the committee for the invitation to attend and discuss this very important issue. I am joined by my colleague,Detective Chief Superintendent Barry Walsh, who is responsible for our Garda National Cyber Crime Bureau.

While not wishing to encroach on the responsibilities and remits of the other State agencies represented here, I must point out that An Garda Síochána continues to have concerns regarding the use of misinformation and disinformation on social media platforms. Many times we have seen the influence of false or misleading information and the effect this can have on our communities, requiring a policing response.

An Garda Síochána has in the past had to resort to issuing statements regarding inaccurate information circulating online. Most recent examples include false claims that properties are to be used as accommodation centres and are subsequently targeted in arson attacks. An Garda Síochána has commented publicly on the challenges of the circulation of completely inaccurate information about particular properties and on the potential for serious harm arising from this, including a risk to life of occupants, such as construction workers and-or security persons who could be inside any such property. Gardaí are continuing to investigate a number of arson attacks and attempts to damage buildings that were falsely rumoured to be intended to house migrants, as well as some buildings that were in fact intended for use as refugee accommodation. An Garda Síochána condemns in the strongest terms any such criminal activity and will fully investigate such activity in every circumstance.

Another recent example includes the allegations of a sexual assault on a child by a number of men residing at an accommodation centre in Kildare, which were completely untrue. These false rumours were widely circulated and were shared by a number of agitators. Following the posting of comments on social media, a group of protesters gathered at a hostel housing migrants in Kildare. During that protest, gardaí were verbally abused and targeted with fireworks and other missiles.

An Garda Síochána continues to receive concerning reports of online abuse from members of the public, including politicians, celebrities, journalists and gardaí, which were instigated by disinformation means. These reports generally include posts which are abusive and-or threatening or harmful to the individual. Each report is fully investigated by An Garda Síochána for criminal offences. These offences can include offences relating but not limited to: the Harassment, Harmful Communications and Related Offences Act 2020; the Non-Fatal Offences Against the Person Act 1997; the Prohibition of Incitement To Hatred Act 1989; the Child Trafficking and Pornography Act 1998; the Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud Offences) Act 2001; the Criminal Justice (Offences Relating to Information Systems) Act 2017; and the Criminal Damage Act 1991.

As more and more social media platforms transition towards the use of end-to-end encryption, it is becoming increasingly difficult for law enforcement and prosecution agencies to process requests for disclosure on accounts used to post abusive or hatred-inciting disinformation online. The end product of this focus on privacy by social media companies is that the perpetrator of crime is afforded more protection than the victim with a ready-made platform to pursue their activity, or spread disinformation, with significant access barriers created for them to hide behind.

It is respectfully submitted that any successful response to the spread of disinformation, via social media or any other online communication sources, can only be achieved as part of a combined societal response, which includes law enforcement agencies, Government agencies and social media platform providers.

Without this joint approach, any response is highly likely to be largely reactive and limited in its effectiveness. At the same time, part of any response must be built on an appropriate reporting and restricting response from the providers and the public who encounter incidents of disinformation that are clearly identifiable as such.

Proactive physical monitoring of social media platforms will not always be a possibility for law enforcement agencies, including An Garda Síochána, given the variety and volume of messages and posts. Ongoing meaningful engagement with social media platforms is essential if the policing response to disinformation is to be effective, ensuring timely and appropriate proactive reporting and that disinformation content removal processes are in place and observed. At the same time, it is imperative that An Garda Síochána continues to harness its positive relationship with the public to foster an environment of engagement and reporting in which users are willing and eager to report incidents of such cases.

In some cases, incidents of disinformation that have been spread via social media and clearly constituting fake or false news with a motivation to confuse, create division or sow seeds of public protest have acted as a catalyst for physical acts that been criminal in nature. From the perspective of An Garda Síochána, there is an inherent difficulty in addressing such disinformation in advance of that physical manifestation. This is because those postings may not be illegal in terms of content, despite it clearly being disinformation.

Removal of material is most commonly achieved via a request to the service provider. Even in circumstances where the post or message is disinformation, it may not actually breach any law. In circumstances where it does breach a statute, a Garda investigator may seek removal, which can be achieved by submitting a written notice or request. Compliance with any such request is entirely a matter for the applicable service provider and An Garda Síochána has no power of compellability that is immediately available for use.

From a criminal investigation perspective, some limitations can arise when it comes to An Garda Síochána’s ability to investigate sources of disinformation or false postings on social media. In order for An Garda Síochána to initiate a criminal investigation, there must first be a criminal offence in this jurisdiction or an element of an offence that is being investigated here so that the member can apply to the court for an order compelling disclosure of relevant evidence, and this is not always the case.

Another recurring difficulty within engagement between An Garda Síochána and social media service providers is the preservation and disclosure process around seeking account and content data from social media platforms used to post disinformation or illegal and abusive content online. While many of the providers have effective online methods for requesting preservation of accounts, serving court issued orders to disclose and receiving the content in response, others do not, or the rules imposed are subject to regular change. Most service providers will state that account content data can only be accessed via legal applications within the jurisdiction where they are headquartered. This necessitates use of the mutual legal assistance process, which can delay access to evidential information for up to 12 months or more.

Encryption is becoming an increasing difficulty when it comes to disinformation. Many of the social media platforms now operate end-to-end encryption and state that they cannot provide copies or content data for accounts.

All of the aforementioned present difficulties for An Garda Síochána when it comes to securing removal of posted disinformation and, when required, in investigating offences arising. However, they are not insurmountable and do not deflect from the organisational enthusiasm to ensure such cases are robustly investigated, to work closely with service providers, the global law enforcement community and the public to monitor content, gather intelligence and, in every circumstance where the option is available, to effect the removal of disinformation posted to social media accounts and platforms.

I will stop Ms Richardson there because she has gone way over time. All of my colleagues have her statement. Can we take it as read? I am sure most of the information will be extracted in the discussion later. We will now move on to questions from my colleagues, to whom a speaking rota has been circulated.

When we debated what became the Online Safety and Media Regulation, OSMR, Act, there was a reluctance, shall we say, to include disinformation in that. The argument made at the time was that the DSA would cover all aspects of that. Given that we have the headquarters of many of the companies here in this State and from a domestic point of view, if we did not have the DSA, we have no homework done, as such, have we?

It is good we have the DSA because that is a maximum harmonising measure. It is a horizontal measure. The OSMR transposed the audiovisual media services directive, AVMSD, which is kind of a vertical measure, so that fits in with the DSA. All of the provisions in the DSA - Coimisiún na Meán is probably more qualified than I am to talk about how they will operate – would cover disinformation in respect of risk assessments and all those kinds of things.

My point is that we would be way behind the times if it were not for the DSA. Although we have these companies and their headquarters in this State, there were no initiatives from the Department or anyone else to look at a manner or means of regulating them. There were no recommendations or anything of that description. We relied entirely on transposing the DSA. That is correct, is it not?

It would be perfect if Mr. Hempenstall could do that.

Mr. Godfrey mentioned the broadcasting moratorium review, which was to be looked at towards the end of the year. Could he give us a brief update on that? I would also like an update on the online safety code, whether or not disinformation is included in that and how the provisions of same could be enforced.

On the moratorium, we - or the Broadcasting Authority of Ireland, BAI, our predecessor organisation - did some research. The broadcasters hate it and would like to see it gone. The input from the public was more mixed. When we looked at what is happening in other jurisdictions, we discovered it is more mixed in that some jurisdictions are seeking to expand the moratorium to cover online content. We intend to complete our review of the moratorium, hopefully in time for the next elections here. We are looking at the balance between dealing with the problem of disinformation being amplified by it being broadcast during the moratorium period versus the advantage of allowing trusted journalists online to debunk disinformation. We are doing a little of research, and we will consult and make a decision in time for the next election.

The online safety code is under the OSMR Act. It deals with harmful online content but not with disinformation as such, unless the disinformation is in a certain form. For example, if it is a video that incites hatred or violence against a group of people on account of, for example, their race or religion, then it might then come into the online safety code. However, it is not directly dealing with disinformation.

I will move to Ms Richardson and An Garda Síochána's submission and also touch on that of the working group chaired by Ms Chapman. Having read the submissions, am I right in saying disinformation is not a crime in itself? It is what comes of it, maybe, or actions taken on foot of disinformation that could result in a criminal offence.

We also have to get orders in relation to ensuring any evidence can be extracted. They do not volunteer that. However, it should be known that it is up to the social media companies themselves as to whether they assess the information that is online and it is up to them to take it down. We cannot force them. As I said, there is no compellability if there is a criminal act involved, so they cannot take it down. Again, they assess what they see. We can make a complaint to them about it, but it is up to the companies.

All right. Moving to the working group, therein lies the problem, does it not? It is the monitoring and the platforms themselves taking action in sufficient time to prevent events spiralling out of control. I was just reading the group's submission. Towards the end it states:

The Working Group is in the process of developing a national strategy. The purpose of which is not to decide what is and isn't disinformation. Neither is it to call for new legislation. The purpose of the strategy is to adopt a rights-based approach to countering disinformation and encourage cross-sector cooperation, collaboration and coordination to achieve better outcomes all round.

That is lovely, flowery, catch-all language, but in real terms what does it mean? It is nondescript and non-specific. It does not give comfort. It seems the group is not there to make recommendations, decide what is or is not disinformation or call for new legislation. Ms Chapman can look at the Garda submission and what is going on day to day. She is saying before her report is finished that it is not her role to recommend legislation, but what if something comes to the fore that indicates we actually have to implement this and it needs enforcement as opposed to a recommendation? If only we had a penny for every time recommendations were made in this State that were so loose they were not worth the paper they are written on. Consequently, for the working group to be set up and state that making recommendations or calling for new legislation will not be an outcome does not give us much confidence, does it? As I said, it is flowery, catch-all language.

The stage we are at is the strategy is being developed and there will be quite a number of recommended actions included in it. Each of those will have an owner. We are working with each of the bodies that will have responsibility for delivering those actions as well. Unfortunately, we are just not at an advanced stage where we can present those to the committee. There are, however, definitely recommended actions there as well.

The working group operates by consensus. The remit for the working group comes from the Future of Media Commission report. At the very heart of that was the call for co-ordination, which was a recognition that the issue of disinformation cannot really be addressed by any single Department or organisation. It affects so many different parts of society and there are so many contributing factors that in order to address it in any comprehensive way there will be a requirement for a high degree of co-ordination and collaboration across different Departments and bodies.

The working group is dealing with the social media platforms. If those platforms are part of the overall group and it is trying to reach consensus, it goes without saying that when it comes to recommendations they will kick back against certain recommendations. Is that not where the problem lies then? If the group is seeking consensus, it is going to have to water down proposals.

On the consensus, we work very closely with Coimisiún na Meán on the recommendations linked to the effective implementation of legislation. Then there are other recommended actions specifically in the area of media literacy. Again, there are different areas of actions dealing with different aspects of disinformation.

Yes, but it is still too watery or watered down. I point to the statement in the submission that "Neither is it [its remit] to call for new legislation". It is dismissing that straight away, whether or not the working group comes across an area in which it is glaringly obvious that legislation is needed for it to be effective.

We can think of this strategy as a first step. This is not something that can be produced and then put on a shelf where it stays in that state. Disinformation will evolve, so the response to it needs to evolve as well. At this stage, we have a number of different legislative levers and between the European Media Freedom Act, the DSA and so on, there is a lot already coming down the line. One of the recommendations will be ongoing oversight of the recommendations. If, out of that, it appears there is a gap, it is at that stage that there would be further recommendations. However, there is quite a lot of legislation in place already, so we need to give that a chance to start to roll out, embed and see what is getting covered. Then it is about whether there are gaps after that.

There is text to be concluded as part of the actions and then we will have to share the body of the strategy itself with the working group and go through that with the group. We have a lot of work done because, as part of the process, we published the scoping reports and expert reports, so much of the material is already there. It is a question of assembling it in the right order, ensuring everything flows and then finalising the text of the actions, including, as Ms Chapman said, the owners.

One of the main reasons we said the strategy will not call for new legislation is precisely as Ms Chapman outlined, namely, the Digital Services Act is a landmark.

There are significant resources being devoted to it in the form of Coimisiún na Meán and its digital services co-ordinator. It has only been applied to all platforms since February 2024. The Online Safety and Media Regulation Act 2022 is a pretty big deal as well. There is the AI Act-----

In fairness, if the Deputy says disinformation is exploding, that is precisely why it is important we allow Coimisiún na Meán, which has been implementing it in Ireland for a few months, that is, since February 2024, to get up and running on that. The impact of the DSA can already be seen. The European Commission announced investigations into how a range of platforms are operating. TikTok took down its TikTok Lite app before it started in France and Spain. While I do not wish to labour the point, it is only getting started. It would probably not be the right time to call for more legislation when the DSA is being implemented right now.

I thank all of our witnesses for addressing this very important issue. To paraphrase Ms Chapman, this is not about people holding opinions which are not based on evidence or even about people holding opinions which may be viewed as dangerous in some ways. It is about the online harms they can cause as a result of the spread of that misinformation and disinformation. The statement made by Ms Richardson on behalf of An Garda Síochána was quite strong in that regard. Can she give me an idea as to the level of Garda resources that are now addressing misinformation and disinformation, both in terms of gardaí who are directly addressing this area and the amount of Garda time spent dealing with this?

It depends on what manifests out of the disinformation. If there is a call to protest or, as I said, misinformation or disinformation around a certain accommodation centre and a protest occurs, we obviously have to police that protest. Resources are taken from something else in order to police that. In addition, if there are threats or something else that comes out of that, there is obviously an investigative process it has to be put through. Resources are being utilised and brought from one area to another in order to try to deal with the manifestation and the impact that it has on our policing. I cannot say X amount is involved in this or X amount in that. It just depends. Some parts of the policing requirement are reactive and others proactive. At all times, our police response fully and robustly investigates everything that manifests out from the impact of the disinformation.

In the context of the rise of online disinformation and misinformation, during the Covid-19 period, there was a particular impact which required a Garda response. That is now manifesting itself in certain ways around certain anti-migrant protects and so on. Is An Garda Síochána observing a trend in this regard? Is it a case that a lot of the people who were involved in the anti-Covid-19 protests are now also involved in the anti-immigration protests?

The area which concerns us, on which the Commissioner has previously commented, is the increase in right-wing activity that manifests into criminal or potential criminal activity. Again, it depends. There are different areas. There was a separate concern with Covid-19 and a fear factor was being put out through online disinformation. At that stage, we could see the same misinformation messages that were being sent in French and German in France and Germany being sent again, pretending to be from a person someone knows who has said this, etc. That manifests fear. While I do not want to go into it, there have been cases in which people have been prosecuted. There are people who continue to attend protests which veer towards criminal activity. They are all being addressed and investigated.

From my experience, that is exactly the situation. All service providers will comply with the legal requirement. That is how they operate. There is very little black and white in terms of how they engage. If they are lawfully required to do so, they will follow it all. That has been our experience over the years. I do not believe there has been any dissent in that regard. This tends be reactive in nature, which might not be what is required; disinformation may need a more proactive response. There is no one platform which stands out, in terms of a reactive investigation, as being uncooperative.

I might come to Ms Chapman and Dr. Culloty. Coimisiún na Meán may wish to come in on this as well. Ms Chapman and Dr. Culloty mentioned the attention economy. Some of the challenges lie with the business models used by these platforms, particularly in cases in which they amplify disinformation and misinformation. I think back to when X came before this committee in private session. In effect, it said its algorithms are driven by likes and shares. That is it. There are no standards. Other platforms adopt a different approach. Can the witnesses comment on the use of particular algorithms by some of the platforms and whether they feel the platforms are doing enough to be able to address this question of the amplification of disinformation and misinformation?

Sometimes, there is a lot of confusion about the concept of algorithms because every company has lots of different algorithms. The value of thinking about the economics and the business models is that is generally why things are set up. They are set up to make money and they make money by getting attention. We can assume this is what drives a lot of these things. The long-standing issue with technology companies is they have not been very forthcoming with what is called algorithmic transparency and algorithmic accountability. One of the virtues of the DSA is supposed to be that we will now have mechanisms in place to actually find out whether these algorithms are causing harm or not. However, that is going to take a long time to get through.

As for specific companies, the experiment Global Witness did on political advertising ahead of the elections was very interesting. Twitter actually did not feature any of the advertisements which contravened the rules, but TikTok did. YouTube featured one or two advertisements. Maybe we need more of that type of stuff which tests these platforms and points out when they breach their rules. The Senator may be aware there is a code of practice on disinformation through the BAI, the precursor of Coimisiún na Meán. In DCU, we have done a lot of work on that. Platforms can write reports and say they are doing X, Y and Z. They are asked to be transparent about their algorithms but we do not have good reasons to believe them until we do that type of testing.

I thank the Senator. I do not want to go into too much detail about how we might be monitoring compliance. However, mystery shopping, as it were, is certainly part of our plan and we aim to set up a unit to do that.

I will comment more generally on the recommender systems. I think Senator Byrne is right to say that the business model is a big driver of why platforms care more about engagement than they do about safety and disinformation. Within the DSA there are several obligations, which I can share if the committee would like, but it has been four months since the DSA came into force and became fully applicable. While what is written in the words of the DSA looks good, if the platforms did take those obligations seriously, it would make a big difference. We are in the early stages of getting platforms to come into compliance with all their obligations in the way that they are envisaged.

The question can be asked of me in a different way, but I am not going to name names. We are establishing a supervisory relationship with them and we get information. We are, however, currently assessing whether we think they are compliant with their obligations and in which ways they are not compliant, so that we can take it to the next stage of our supervisory approach.

We have concerns about all of them, though not the same concerns about each of them. We have concerns, in different ways, about their obligations to make it easy to report illegal content, the timeliness and accuracy that they respond to this, whether they are open about the internal review processes and that whole end-to-end process. There are concerns around how they operate their recommender systems and whether they are properly protecting the interests of children. As we heard from An Garda Síochána, they all have terms and conditions that relate to disinformation and misinformation around what people should not put up and they have an obligation to properly apply those terms and conditions. We have some concerns about whether they are properly doing so. We are in the initial stages of assessment but together with the European Commission, we will start taking action to achieve improvements.

It was referenced in the Garda presentation and again, anyone on the panel may wish to respond to it, the use of artificial intelligence and large language models for spreading misinformation and disinformation poses an even more significant challenge. Could the witnesses discuss some of the concerns or fears they might have regarding AI, particularly the spread and creation of misinformation and disinformation? Perhaps, they might also talk about how AI might be used to counter misinformation and disinformation as well. I am not sure who might comment there.

I will make a comment on this and I am sure others will too. The downside of AI is it provides the opportunity to create deepfakes, which can be a form of disinformation or misinformation. I was in the US last week and they were telling me about deepfake robocalls in the US. This is when a person receives a phone call and that person thinks it is President Biden saying he is opening the border to Mexico, or whatever it is, and that has been a phenomenon there. The deployment of deepfakes is another form of disinformation. The AI Act has obligations within it for transparency for watermarking of AI-generated content. The current guidelines within the AI Act will also require platforms to at least flag AI-generated content when it is seen. That is the downside.

The upside is that AI is also used to flag content for moderation purposes. AI can be used to identify potential disinformation or misinformation in order for it to be more effectively moderated and removed. It can cut both way in terms of the large language models.

I will also add that we can become too obsessed with AI as the new technology. It is just going to become more widespread than it already is. It is like Photoshop, in that it is just going to be used continuously. The real challenge is not so much flagging things that were made with AI. Most companies are focused on stamping something saying this was made with AI. It is rather how something can be stamped to say this is true. That is what becomes most challenging, in order that citizens can find and know that something is true. This is where the supports for journalism and reliable media become so important.

I have one final question on the National Cyber Security Centre. Obviously, the Garda works with the centre closely, which has highlighted a strong correlation between cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns, particularly coming from outside of the State and it instances in particular Russia and China. What is the witness's experience within the Garda of working with the National Cyber Security Centre? Is the Garda seeing a link happening between cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns?

From our perspective, threats of nation states and whatever else are not talked about. With disinformation, the more plausible attack is one where there is a link for somebody to click on, and individuals are more likely to engage with that. That is a form of disinformation, in that somebody believes that they are going to click on something legitimate. That then is the source, in a lot of cases, of large-scale ransomware and large-scale cyberattacks. That is probably how it feeds into the cyber landscape. We work very closely with the National Cyber Security Centre in terms of its remit and our remit. It is more in that area that we would deal with it on a frequent basis.

I was in my office and chairing earlier on, so I was following two different sections. There have been many flashpoints of disinformation and misinformation but one that jumps to mind for me is the Dublin riots. There was a flashpoint there where a correlation, a combination or a coming together of all sorts of different things resulted in what was an extraordinarily serious situation. It was globally covered, and no one could believe what was happening as it was happening. Disinformation was the key thing that set that whole situation off. I might tease through that and what we can learn from that. We need to understand what we can do going forward to ensure something like that does not happen again, as well as the different remits the witnesses have to try to tackle that or even remits outside of those of us within the room. We must understand what is it that social media companies need to do.

One of the issues was that many people perceived social media companies to be very slow to respond to things that were flying around. It took a while, for example, for tags to appear underneath things to explain it was not actually the Army driving up the motorway to Dublin. These things took ages to appear and by then, the videos had been taken off and were flying around on end-to-end encrypted messaging, like WhatsApp and Signal and so on. Another problem was the things that were going online were being taken off, and I know that is being referenced here in respect of the challenges that end-to-end encryption is posing in tackling disinformation. What did we learn from the Dublin riots that can be used going forward in the various guises of those who are here to either challenge or tackle the disinformation as it spread in that instance?

I am thinking of whether something like this could ever happen again. What is it that was learned from the respective organisations here that needs to be done to tackle the disinformation? That is what ultimately resulted in the chaos and pandemonium that we saw on our streets. What do we need to do? At what point do we realise that it has moved from being a mildly chaotic situation online? Those happen; we are seeing more of these flashpoints of chaos online and they were referenced in the opening statements where there are protests outside migrant centres because there are accusations of something inside. Violent scenes are happening and members of an Garda Síochána are being targeted. A Pride disco in Newtownmountkennedy was cancelled because of aggro and threats. These things are having serious knock-on consequences.

I will go back to the question of what needs to be done so we do not end up with a flashpoint where this is happening and the streets of our capital city under fire. Broadly, how do we stop this from happening again What did we learn from that situation? Specifically, how do we grasp disinformation before it gets out of hand? Have the social media companies done anything to make the lives of the witnesses a little bit easier?

I can come in on some high-level comments and I am sure colleagues will want to come in with more detailed responses.

A lot of factors contribute contribution and to the harm that can come from disinformation. One of the key things about disinformation is that it exploits human vulnerabilities, that is, the fears and concerns that people have. One aspect of countering disinformation is to try to address the underlying issues that make people vulnerable to disinformation narratives in the first place.

We have also got the role of media literacy and being able to empower people with the skills, knowledge and confidence to interrogate the information they are getting and. as Mr. Godfrey said, understand the ownership of media, the operation of media and what media is regulated and how. That is all knowledge that enables people to make informed choices and to be able to judge the reliability and accuracy of information.

Thinking about the particular situation that the Senator described, there is something there about prebunking and also debunking and being able to see if there is a particular disinformation narrative see that is coming up the ranks and being able to prebunk that in a timely manner. With prebunking and debunking, it is a delicate situation. What we do not want to do is to draw attention to something and inadvertently help to amplify it but if it is left too late, it comes to the old saying that the lie is halfway around the world before the truth has its boots on. We have to ensure that the public has access to accurate and reliable public information. These are some of the factors around this.

Other colleagues would probably like to comment on that.

The day after the riots, our working group had a meeting and the Hope and Courage Collective gave the expert presentation. Its representatives talked about meeting people where they are at and the idea of local, tailored communications about local issues, even from peers and peer groups or using different ways to communicate messages that make sense to people where they are. That is not going to fix what happened on 23 November. It is a slice of what Ms Chapman is talking about in terms of empowering people to participate fully in society, to believe things that are incorrect if they want but to be able to talk about it with other people and find ways to communicate about those issues.

Again to pick up on what she said, addressing the sectoral and societal issues that give rise to disinformation is necessary. As secretary to the group, the idea of co-ordinating and collaborating is not sexy or cool and does sound wishy-washy at times, but for this strategy it is vital because there are so many things going on across society to address disinformation. Let us consider the variety of people we have here. This strategy will hopefully bring those people together an ongoing, structured basis to address the issues we have been talking about.

I might pick up on some of the comments. Ms Chapman talked about prebunking. Before we get to the day of the riots, one of the things that happened was that there was fertile ground because there had been plenty of promotion of hatred against people from ethnic minorities circulating. The tinder was dry for a spark. One thing that is important is to enforce the regulatory obligations that the platforms have in respect of hate speech so that the environment is less receptive to these things. There is provision in the DSA for the creation of a crisis response protocol. On the day the Dublin riots happened and we found out about the stabbing incident, we did not have any powers at that time, but we called up the platforms and said that we had heard the news and were concerned that it might become an excuse for the promotion of hatred and violence. We did not have enough foresight to predict where it might lead. The platforms said they stood up their instant response teams but it was a one-by-one situation.

In a way we would like people's first instinct when something like this happens to be to turn on the television or the radio to seek accurate, reliable sources of information. Somebody else talked about meeting people where they are. That also means that our national broadcasters, as reliable sources of information, need to be present on social media and deploying their news on social media. Part of a crisis response protocol and we talked about recommender algorithms, could be giving prominence to reliable sources of media so that anyone who is looking for information, who may get a stream of tanks rolling up the M50, should absolutely be made to watch what RTÉ or Virgin Media or another trusted broadcaster or member of the press is putting in their videos so that they can see good stuff.

The European Commission was involved with us in our day after engagements with platforms to find out what they had done and what was happening and what they might do differently. That was the beginning of learning for the development of the crisis response protocol. That is still something that has to be worked out around the whole of Europe. Another good thing is that Ireland is not the only place prone to these kinds of crises. Making sure that a protocol is developed on a pan-European basis gives us quite a lot of heft in getting the platforms to comply or to help.

As the Senator said, this is a cross-societal, multiagency approach. We are dealing with the harm afterwards. While every focus is on the violent disorder itself, it was predicated on an horrendous act against children. We could never have said that this was the act that was going to cause it, but that act could never have been foreseen. However, engagement with the different agencies and society in general on this is vital. As I said, we need to talk to people as they are. We can talk through a national broadcasters saying this is fake news or disinformation, but we need to engage with the platforms that people are on to get that done.

It is very interesting what Ms Richardson said about the algorithm and feeding something to the top of it, because I had the most bizarre things coming up.

Obviously I was looking for it so the algorithm was then just feeding me any old deranged rubbish. I was thinking that this was clearly insanity but people were furiously retweeting it and believing it. Therefore, there is that idea of the trusted source and how that gets pushed if the algorithm is going to feed itself as the monster wants to do.

I also think as well that while it appeared at the time to be quite a long-term event, it was actually very short in nature. That quite violent part of it lasted an hour and a half and it was very much on. At that stage, people were able to gauge that this was disinformation that was going on. That shored up the work of An Garda Síochána on that night as well.

I thank all the witnesses for being here today and for the work they do in all of their respective professions because it is immensely important work on behalf of the State and its citizens. Of all the very detailed opening statements for which I thank the witnesses, the line that was probably the most frightening was Ms Chapman's when she said that people were entitled to believe things that are incorrect in a free society. That is worrying. As politicians, maybe we play to that as well. However, it is very true.

Dr. Culloty addressed the whole issue raised by Senator Malcolm Byrne in respect of AI and said that the most important thing was putting a stamp on it to state whether it was true or not and the supports for journalism needed to do that. However, of course, that is in a media landscape and in newsrooms that are disintegrating rapidly and in a media market that is financially broken, both from the traditional media and indeed other forms of media as well. In the context of trying to achieve what Dr. Culloty has said, which is a huge body of work, what are the levels of support for journalism and how do we administer such a thing to give people the reliability they seek?

It is a big challenge. It is perhaps even worse than that if you think about the AI issue as putting us back to where we were in the 1990s with a whole new set of technologies and, as I said, a fairly small group of companies that now are about to monopolise the new technology themselves. We can already see, and perhaps members have noticed, that if you go to certain search engines or platforms, there is a lot less news content and a lot more AI-generated content piggybacking on value and original content created by someone else. The issue across all countries now is how we fund and support journalism. I am throwing out more challenges than answers here. The other thing we are going to have to grapple with is that as this problem gets worse - when we are not going to go back to a day where news media can be easily funded by advertising, which it was historically - the challenge becomes how states define their intervention and how we maintain that separation between public funding for media and an independent, pluralistic, diverse media system. Some countries-----

Inevitably, that is going to be what happens. It is not just a national media issue. There is also the local media. We want vibrant and diverse local media as well. The Australians engaged in a bargaining system where they forced the tech companies to bargain with news media. That appeared to be quite successful but the tech companies were just pulling away from news altogether so that model is not going to work elsewhere but there has to be something more drastic done. I would suggest that there is one group of companies that have made crazy and unprecedented amounts of money from this system and we have a democratic need for news. The two go together.

If I can turn to Mr. Godfrey in respect of that and that challenge he and his organisation faces, when we look at the recent writers' newsworthy report, to be positive about it, people still have an interest in news. Things change. I am old school so when I see a readership of 3% for newspapers and 33% for online it depresses me but that is the reality. The fundamentals of good journalism do not change whether you read it online or in a newspaper. What is depressing is when you drill down in some of the figures and you look at the 18 to 24-year-old bracket and 41% of that bracket saying they discover their news on social media. That is worrying as these platforms have deprioritised news. To go back to Dr. Culloty's point, how are we going to address that balance and address those statistics showing clearly the platforms' ability for the spread of disinformation?

In a way, as the Senator says, where you read the news, whether you read it on an inky piece of paper or on a screen is much less important than the quality of the news you are reading and its reliability. One issue for us is the role of public service media. The Future of Media Commission very much said not to talk about public service broadcasters but to talk about public service media organisations. It is where they deploy their news content so it is important they are present online and on social media. If that is where the audience is, they need to be present there. Therefore, when we think about the funding of public service media and about some of the journalism schemes that Coimisiún na Meán is being asked to roll out, we definitely need to be thinking not just about how that journalism is deployed through traditional channels but how it is deployed through those other channels. Then to come to the Senator's point about the deprioritisation of news, one of the things in the Digital Services Act is that the large platforms have to do risk assessments. That includes risks to public civic discourse, to elections, to public order and public health. For all of those there is a risk as a result of disinformation or misinformation about those topics and that risk can always be mitigated by making sure it is good quality journalism that gets due prominence. One of the things we need to get the European Commission to do, because this is their competence not ours, is to make sure the mitigation measures that the big platforms put in place, include giving due prominence to trusted sources of news.

Bar anyone thinking I am anti the online platforms, when newspapers ruled the roost, the disinformation in printed news was just as rife. I know in college we used the tabloid battles of the 80s in the UK as part of our case studies and the phone hacking and the pure lies that were driven in what used to be good quality papers. It was just as rife in the printed news as well. However, that leads me to the issue of media literacy in respect of Mr. Godfrey speaking about the need for this and for informed choices. Disinformation is important to me in the context of political debate. Going back to the last US election, a metadata scientist warned a week after that election that 10% of all political content views were of posts that falsely claimed vote fraud. That warning was acted upon by Meta in respect of that data scientist. As the weeks passed, those percentages grew, culminating in the Capitol Hill riot. Still today, 38% of Americans believe the election was fraudulent. In this country after the last election we had claims by a political party that won only 37 seats that they had won the election. That is 44 seats short of a majority and the party claimed Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael had stolen the election. That narrative gained traction on social media as well. We are not that far away from Capitol Hill riots in this country when you see what happened with the Dublin riots. When Mr. Godfrey calls for media literacy, what does that mean in real terms for that 18 to 24-year-old category I spoke about who are accessing social media purely for their news?

On that point, Mr. Hempenstall spoke about not calling for new legislation but Art O'Leary from the Electoral Commission made the point before the recent elections a couple of weeks ago that the commission still does not have the legal powers to direct social media companies to take down online media material that is damaging to the electoral process. Instead, it can just warn of reputational damage to companies which it believes might be enough. Mr. O'Leary spoke about the cyber risk and how the UK electoral commission had been compromised by a China-based cyber group. The same could happen here, notwithstanding the fact that they are tested by the National Cyber Security Centre.

I ask for a comment on Mr. O'Leary's view.

I am not going to qualify the views of the chief executive of An Coimisiún Toghcháin on this. The general scheme of an electoral reform (amendment) Bill was approved by the Government yesterday and it will address electoral process disinformation. I believe what the Senator is talking about is Part 5 of the Electoral Reform Act 2022 which was not commenced. The Government has reconsidered that, made amendments to that Part and our colleagues in the Department of Housing, Local Government and Heritage will publish the general scheme of that Bill in due course. An Coimisiún Toghcháin is a member of the working group and participates as such.

On the question about electoral disinformation, I believe that is a sign of good progress.

I thank Ms Richardson for her frank and detailed statement. The committee appreciates the work that she and her colleagues in An Garda Síochána are doing.

She stated that social media platforms have asserted that they take seriously their responsibility to block and remove disinformation. She then stated honestly that "such actions are also predicated on their stated obligation to facilitate the free expression of information and the right to the freedom of speech". As the Leas-Chathaoirleach said, these guys trade on "likes" and "shares". I hold no hope in respect of their desire to act responsibly and that comes from a series of hearings with them over a number of years. I do not share any hope in respect of them.

On the impact social media platforms are having, Ms Richardson's engagement with them and the assertion that they are taking responsibility, how does Ms Richardson feel that responsibility is being shown in reality?

It is being shown in reality because they are complying with any legal requirement that they have been asked to adhere to. If a warrant or order is served on them to produce something, they will do so. Also, with regard to a request for preservation of a page or site, that is also being complied with. Where we have legal means, they comply.

Ms Richardson stated this will not be solved in one area but requires a societal approach involving the law, enforcement, the Oireachtas and the social media companies themselves. In that respect, I was interested that in March the National Union of Journalists, NUJ, was highly critical of An Garda Síochána and the Commissioner with regard to the acquisition of images taken from the Dublin riots which were going to help An Garda Síochána do its job. The Press Association and Peter Clifton were highly critical, stating this was interfering with the democratic process of journalists. What is Ms Richardson's opinion of the Garda doing its work to thwart those who sought to use disinformation to bring violence to our streets and the NUJ battling with it in respect of these images?

I am not aware of that particular article. When we are investigating a criminal offence, we investigate all aspects of it so that may have been part of an evidence trail we needed in relation to it. We engage very well with the NUJ and journalists. We have a forum on attacks on journalists themselves as part of disinformation and online abuse. We engage in ensuring that any offence that comes to our attention will be investigated.

The contention is that if the NUJ complies with what the Garda is seeking through court orders, its members would then become targets of rioters' venom during such incidents because those who do not have any regard for the law will believe that journalists are complicit with An Garda Síochána and are equally legitimate targets for rioters.

That is a wider issue with respect to victims of crime. If witnesses come forward, that is always a concern they have in that regard. I do not want to specifically comment on that particular case but, with regard to any witness or victim, we always encourage them to come forward in relation in order to ensure that we can try to get a positive outcome on an investigation in relation to it.

I will ask Ms Richardson about something the committee dealt with three years ago as part of our work on the Online Safety and Media Regulation Bill. We met with a young Cork youth activist, Alicia O'Sullivan, who was then 19. She very bravely appeared before this committee regarding an incident that happened to her. A false Instagram account was set up in her name, images were taken from her legitimate Instagram account and coupled with naked videos and pictures of another girl and an account was set up to sell porn through that. This was obviously a high profile cast at the time. She was critical when she first reported this to An Garda Síochána. A commitment was given at the time regarding the resources available to the Garda to deal with this issue because online crimes had changed. In the three-year period since, how has that commitment progressed? What is the trend in that sphere given that these kinds of crimes are just as appalling as if someone was assaulted on the street?

Again, I will not comment on individual cases. If there had not been the element of sextortion or the sexually explicit photos on that account, setting up a false account or an account with somebody's name is not necessarily a criminal offence. However, there was criminal activity in the situation described by the Senator and that could be investigated.

Again, we encourage anybody who feels they are a victim of a crime, whether one of the types of offence I mentioned or another offence, to report it and come forward and we will robustly investigate it.

I will just comment on what could happen now. Non-consensual intimate image sharing is now a criminal offence. Whether that is a fake or real image, if it depicts somebody, it is a criminal offence. That would mean that the images are illegal content. Under the Digital Services Act, anybody who is suffering a similar experience has an absolute right to ask the platforms to take it down. If they do not get satisfaction from the platforms, they should come to us and our contact centre. We would regard that as a very high priority and would take the matter up with the platforms if the content was not taken down immediately. There is a mechanism now which ought to be able to result in anyone suffering from that to get the content taken down very quickly. We will give people every assistance if they need it.

I thank everyone again for the work they are doing. We could continue this discussion for a long time. I return to Dr. Culloty's point on funding trusted journalism. It is a broader issue. Advertising has collapsed in the traditional media. We see where the advertising markets are going. Equally, there is a duty of care among the public, to return to Ms Chapman's point, as to whether they want believe something or not. They will have to pay for content to get reliable news because it costs money to run newsrooms. That needs to be said repeatedly. It is why I advocate retaining the licence fee so that people make a contribution to pay for trusted news journalism. It costs money to run newsrooms and we should be prepared to fund them, not just the State but also from our own pockets.

I have a question on the issue raised regarding something that is identified as criminal activity and as regards extraterritoriality because some of the platforms we are dealing with are not based in the State.

It may be for either the Garda or the coimisiún to respond as to how they are dealing with some of those challenges where activity that is deemed criminal is being hosted by a platform based outside the State.

There are well-established protocols for dealing with service providers that are based in the State but that are hosted outside of the State. That is generally what we encounter. We can generally get subscriber information and other types of information. That is readily available to us. However, when we go to get content, we tend to use the mutual legal assistance process. That can be time consuming. There is no way around it. It is just the process we deal with. Overall, as has been pointed out, the service providers have been very proactive on intimate image abuse. That is my experience as well. As I have said, legislation has been introduced in the intervening years between what was pointed out earlier and now. That legislation has been very beneficial.

All the platforms that have users in the EU are bound by the Digital Services Act, whether they are headquartered in Ireland or anywhere else. We in Ireland have to uphold the rights not just of Irish users but of users across the EU. I do not believe it is controversial to name the platforms that are not based in Ireland. Snapchat snappies are regulated out of the Netherlands. Telegram is regulated out of Belgium. Some of the adult platforms are based in Cyprus or Slovenia. The European Commission also has a role in dealing with the larger platforms. Everybody has the same rights. The platforms are obliged to make reporting mechanisms available. If an Irish citizen or someone who is based in Ireland is not getting satisfaction, he or she can complain to us. If it is not a company we regulate, there is a network of digital service co-ordinators across Europe and we have a mechanism for referring complaints from one to another. That is getting up and running now. Not every member state has a digital services co-ordinator yet but, when that is all up and running, the mutual co-operation arrangements should make it unimportant to users in Ireland whether the platform with which they have a grievance is based here or elsewhere in Europe.

I thank all of our witnesses not just for their contributions today but for their work in this area, which is very important. As they will appreciate, these are very live issues in all of our lives and not just here in the Oireachtas. It is critical to note that there is a wider public debate around some of these issues. It is not all about regulation or legislation. It is also about education and literacy, which are key issues we need to address. Would anybody like to make any final comments before I bring this public session to a close? Okay. I thank the witnesses for their helpful contributions. The public session of this meeting is now finished. We will go into private session in a moment.