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Background Information[edit]

History[edit]

Main article: See blood diamonds.

Failed elections [1], money laundering, civil wars (in Angola, Liberia, and other parts of Africa) etc. have encouraged a significant amount of illegal gem sales, with profits aiding rebel forces like the RUF and the UNITA and allowing for the continuation of civil unrest. Funds are used for foreign representation, travel, commodity procurement, and arms purchases, among other things. [2] Despite the United Nations embargo on UNITA diamonds in 1993 - and other measures including an arms embargo, a travel ban on the group's leaders, the closure of its overseas offices, and financial sanctions - the rebels have continued profiting; though reports differ, it is estimated UNITA produced about $600 million in diamonds annually in the late 1990s. [3] In 1998 UNITA repealed a peace treaty and returned to war with the Angolan army, prompting the United Nations Security Council to investigate sanctions-busting operations and helping focus international attention on the link between diamonds and conflict in Africa [4]. On 28 November 2002, in Gaborone, Botswana, negotiators for dozens of diamond exporting and importing countries ended over a year of negotiations and agreed on the elements of an international certification program [5], which would become the Kimberley Processing Certification Scheme.

The United States did not join in legislative action against the blood diamond trade until it was learned that Al-Qaeda terrorists may have laundered millions of dollars using Sierra Leone "conflict diamonds" [6]. A few years prior, the US had helped to broker a "peace accord" in Sierra Leone in 1999 which ultimately helped rebels reclaim control of the country.[7]. As the largest consumer of diamonds in the world, the United States also had more of a responsibility to take initiative in supporting the KPCS and in the CDTA legislation; without their support, the rest of the world had much less incentive to join the program. [8] The Washington Times wrote, "If the White House fails to immediately shore up the legislation, blood diamonds will symbolize Mr. Clinton's stained legacy in Africa" [9].

Kimberley Processing Certification Scheme[edit]

Main article: See KPCS.

The KPCS system was passed by the bill as the main deterrent to blood diamonds - it requires diamonds to be transported in tamper proof containers with a government validated certificate as to authenticate their origins. It was able to reduce the ease with which conflict diamonds entered the legitimate diamond market within its first few years of implementation [10]. However, because membership in the system is voluntary, non-compliance soon became a problem in the United States, and especially in Brazil and Venezuela. Reports submitted to the United Nations Security Council in October 2002 charge that both the Angolan rebel leader, Mr. Jonas Savimbi, and the Liberian government still violate the trade and weapons bans with the help of a global network of arms dealers, diamond merchants and natural resources companies [11]. Other logistical issues continue to hinder the success of the KPCS. Terrorist organizations can transport diamonds over borders without detection and convert them back into banknotes whenever they need the money [12]. Leaders have to use discretion when increasing sanctions, because though they help to discourage conflict diamonds, they can also stunt the growth and development necessary for the countries' fragile economies. "It's clear that international traders are always ready to bypass the sanctions and buy diamonds coming from UNITA," UN official Juan Larrain said in 2000 [13]. African geography is conducive to smuggling, with its long, unpatrolled borders and chronic political instability [14]. “the geographic location of the mines, basically clustered in the finest demarcated reserves in the Lundas and Cuango valley in particular, enabled effective oversight by UNITA’s administration” Satellite phones and Lear jets at their disposal meant that UNITA was never too far removed from dealers willing to pay top dollars and risk flying directly to rebel auctions” “Cash generated through the sale of rough in these capitals can immediately be used or deposited locally rather than relying on transfers from European accounts” [15] <references>

  1. ^ Ottaway, Marina. Postconflict Elections, Democratization, and International Assistance. Edit. Krishna Kumar. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998). 133
  2. ^ Dietrich, Christian. "UNITA’s diamond mining and exporting capacity." Angola's War Economy, Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies (2000): 284.
  3. ^ Jakkie Cillers and Christian Dietrich, edit., Angola’s War Economy: The Role of Oil and Diamonds. (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2000) 148.
  4. ^ Fleshman, Michael. 2002. “‘Conflict Diamonds’ Evade UN Sanctions”. Africa Recovery 15, no. 4. (accessed March 20, 2014). http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/182/33801.html
  5. ^ Fleshman, Michael. 2002. “‘Conflict Diamonds’ Evade UN Sanctions”. Africa Recovery 15, no. 4. (accessed March 20, 2014). http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/182/33801.html
  6. ^ “A Rebel’s Best Friend”, Washington Times, July 23, 2000, (accessed March 23, 2014). http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/api/version1/getDocCui?lni=40T2-3700-00JJ-S2H1&csi=8176&hl=t&hv=t&hnsd=f&hns=t&hgn=t&oc=00240&perma=true
  7. ^ “A Rebel’s Best Friend”, Washington Times, July 23, 2000, (accessed March 23, 2014). http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/api/version1/getDocCui?lni=40T2-3700-00JJ-S2H1&csi=8176&hl=t&hv=t&hnsd=f&hns=t&hgn=t&oc=00240&perma=true
  8. ^ Gooch, Tina Muscarella. 2008. "Conflict Diamonds or Illicit Diamonds: Should the Difference Matter to the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme?." Natural Resources Journal 48, no. 1: 189-214. Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost (accessed March 13, 2014). http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=35269876&site=ehost-live&scope=site
  9. ^ “A Rebel’s Best Friend”, Washington Times, July 23, 2000, (accessed March 23, 2014). http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/api/version1/getDocCui?lni=40T2-3700-00JJ-S2H1&csi=8176&hl=t&hv=t&hnsd=f&hns=t&hgn=t&oc=00240&perma=true
  10. ^ Gooch, Tina Muscarella. 2008. "Conflict Diamonds or Illicit Diamonds: Should the Difference Matter to the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme?." Natural Resources Journal 48, no. 1: 189-214. Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost (accessed March 13, 2014). http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=35269876&site=ehost-live&scope=site
  11. ^ Fleshman, Michael. 2002. “‘Conflict Diamonds’ Evade UN Sanctions”. Africa Recovery 15, no. 4. (accessed March 20, 2014). http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/182/33801.html
  12. ^ “Bin Laden’s Dollars”, The Observer, October 20, 2002, (accessed March 23, 2014). http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/182/33818.html
  13. ^ “Blood Diamonds Kept War Flowing”, South African Press Association (2002). (accessed March 23, 2014). http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/182-diamonds/33811.html
  14. ^ “Smuggling is Easy”, The Economist, March 14, 2002, (accessed March 23, 2014). http://www.economist.com/node/1034471
  15. ^ Dietrich, Christian. "UNITA’s diamond mining and exporting capacity." Angola's War Economy, Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies (2000): 284.