Grand Strategy | The Swiss “Peace Summit” and the competing impulses of war and peace

The recently concluded Swiss “Peace Summit” was a failure. Of the 160 countries invited to the summit, some 68 or so declined to attend. Brazil, the current 20 chair, sought to be an observer and not a participant, its predecessor, India, did not send a political delegation and refused to sign the summit’s final communique as did the incoming G20 Chair, South Africa. Other global South heavyweights such as Mexico, and Saudi Arabia also refused to sign. This is despite the fact the final communique was watered down to accommodate these voices.

The two-day summit, organised by the Swiss government at the request of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, on June 15-16 was more a solidary gathering for Ukraine rather than a peace conference; friends coming together to boost the morale of an embattled neighbour. That is understandable. But, to be honest, morale-boosting diplomatic events can neither help win the war nor end it through mediation.

Why “Peace Summit” failed

There are several reasons why the peace summit failed. For one, it is simply not practical to have a peace conference with 102 delegations at the table, that too without the participation of one of the key parties to the war, Russia. How can there be a ‘peace summit’ without the primary belligerents present at the summit?

Relatedly, by not inviting Russia to Bürgenstock and imposing sanctions on Russia along with the rest of Europe at the start of the war, Switzerland may have compromised its long-held principle of neutrality and indirectly contributed to the summit’s failure. This could also mean that Switzerland may find it hard to continue as an effective mediator between Russia and Ukraine in the future.

Secondly, the Swiss peace summit was a half-measure that left pretty much everyone unhappy. The Ukrainians have no reason to be happy with the final communique (which left much to be desired). The Russians are unhappy with the Swiss for organising what Putin’s foreign minister called a ‘one-sided’ conference. Key global South countries didn’t want to have anything to do with it, and leading Swiss political parties criticised it. The lesson is clear: Half-measures don’t succeed either in war or peace.

Thirdly, perhaps most importantly, the conference was symbolic of the fact that the Europeans are caught between two competing impulses when it comes to the Ukraine war: To fully commit to fighting the war or committing to end the war through a negotiated settlement.

When one travels to various European capitals, as I have done over the past two years, one comes across a Europe that wants to win the war on the battlefield but is unwilling to do what takes to win a war. One also witnesses a Europe that wants a negotiated end to the war but is unwilling to initiate such a process, sometimes even reluctant to talk about a negotiated settlement “in public”. Being unable to decide between fully committing to a war it must win or help negotiate to end the war, these competing impulses have kept Ukraine on life-support but constantly bleeding. How long will Ukraine be able to pay for the indecisiveness in the Western capitals?

If the Swiss conference has taught us anything, it is this: Either the West should be more resolute in helping Ukraine fight Russia (which it currently is not), or it should ask Ukraine to talk to Russia (which it shies away from). What won’t work is shadowboxing, which, in my opinion, was what the Bürgenstock conference amounted to in the end. The Swiss peace conference seemed more about Europeans sharing their sense of anxiety and uncertainty among themselves and with others than about ensuring Ukraine’s survival.

Where do we go from here?

So where do we go from here? For those watching the war from a distance, it is abundantly clear that while this war is directly fought between Russia and Ukraine, there are significant others involved in it. The current strategy of pretending that this is a war between Russia and Ukraine and that those supporting Ukraine are not parties to the war is not a helpful one. The reality is that this is a war involving several countries albeit in varying degrees, and therefore achieving peace or ending the war can only happen if all those parties are serious about finding a solution, one way or another.

Based on my trips to both Ukraine and Russia since the war started two years ago, I am of the opinion that the path to ending the Russia-Ukraine war lies in discreet, carefully designed backchannels between the belligerents and other key parties to the conflict. Secondly, as much as one might wish to argue that this is a war between Russia and Ukraine, the reality is far more complicated. Along with conversations between Russia and Ukraine, there will have to be equally serious and substantive conversations between Russians and Americans. But that may have to wait for a new administration in Washington considering the Biden administration’s potential reluctance to engage Moscow to avoid looking weak in an election year.

For the war to end – however unpopular it might sound – it is important to address Russia’s NATO concerns as it is to address Kyiv’s current and future security concerns. That is why the Istanbul negotiations that took place between Russia and Ukraine immediately after the war started, which focused extensively on addressing the future security concerns of both sides, provide a useful format to revisit.

Happymon Jacob teaches India’s foreign policy at Jawaharlal Nehru University, Delhi, and is the founder of the Council for Strategic and Defence Research, a New Delhi-based think tank. The views expressed are personal